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A deadly virus starts spreading in several communities. Reports are issued warning
of the potential fallout if no action is taken. Yet both national authorities, as well
as the WHO, the United Nations as such, and the international community as a
whole are subjected to harsh criticism for ignoring the initial warning signs. Had
they acted sooner, some say, more lives could have been saved. An overreliance
on epidemiological assessments by national health authorities underplaying the
dimensions of the outbreak leads to flawed decision-making by international
institutions. As a result, the virus can spread across borders before sufficient
awareness is raised. After a few months, the extent of the outbreak overwhelms
national authorities in several countries. The need for a quick response is such
that declarations of states of emergency follow suit. They include, among other
things, exceptional executive powers as well as the derogation of human rights. The
ensuing economic consequences for affected countries are devastating.
The above description may sound familiar. Yet, it does not refer to the COVID-19
pandemic we now witness. It is actually the setting of the beginning of the
2014-2016 West African Ebola Outbreak, a cross-border debacle mostly (though
not exclusively) affecting Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. While this event did not
evolve into a full-blown pandemic, certain parallels to the present situation are easy
to spot. Against this backdrop, a symposium was hosted here at Völkerrechtsblog
in 2016, focusing on the Ebola crisis in West Africa. We then published an edited
volume on international health law in 2017 using this setting as a case study. Amidst
the COVID-19 pandemic, it is high time for a look back at some of our claims.
While infectious disease outbreaks are complex, and thus comparable only to a
certain extent, we show that international governance of such outbreaks builds upon
common elements. These are the building blocks of international health governance;
we wish to further explore here. Here we provide an overview of some of the
findings of our edited volume and seek to apply them to the COVID-19 crisis. A blog
entry can only open the discussion around these complex issues. Our portrayal of
international law back then did not attest to today’s shifting political settings, such
as more recent setbacks of the multilateral world order, or the geopolitical wrestling
between the US and China.
Sketching the building blocks of international health governance
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We argue that there are building blocks of international health governance, which
we can distinguish and that call for further research across individual disease
outbreaks. From an international law perspective, these include 1) the institutional
law governing the WHO; 2) the wider field of general international law, also allowing
for contestation of the WHO in the securitization of health; and 3) the right to health
of individuals. In the edited volume of 2017, we also showed how international
law related to disease outbreaks inevitably requires a cross-cutting approach.
International health governance is a developed field of research in public health,
but not law. Besides legal scholarship, insights are needed from medical and public
health specialists, political scientists, and anthropologists.
Does the type of disease matter for legal analysis, and how?
Comparing disease outbreaks should be undertaken with methodological caution.
The fact that the Ebola virus is quite different from the SARS-CoV-2 virus, which
causes COVID-19, is in many ways relevant to the respective analysis. To begin
with, they are epidemiologically distinct: The way of transmission and, therefore,
degree of contagiousness is much higher for SARS-CoV-2. This may also explain
why Ebola has fortunately not attained global transmission, although there is an
ongoing outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Moreover, countries with poor healthcare capacities were evidently more affected by
Ebola in 2014-2016. The fact that the three countries most affected ranked lowest
amongst multiple indices of preparedness and response in 2014 was seen as a
catalyst. By contrast, no healthcare system has escaped the spread of COVID-19,
though certainly some have fared much better than others.
Determining the factors underlying better vs. worse responses will be a monumental
yet essential interdisciplinary task, not the least for legal scholars: Which public
health measures, including the ones restricting liberties the most, were seen as key
for an effective response? Can we really think of context-independent ‘best practices’
in pandemic response? If so, was there any correlation between ‘success’ or ‘failure’
and the underlying legal framework? What role, if any, did both constitutional and
international law play in determining whether certain measures were adopted sooner
rather than later?
We believe that the answers to these questions regarding the COVID-19 pandemic
must inevitably draw upon the experiences of previous outbreaks. This is where we
see a red thread along the building blocks that underlie the international governance
of infectious disease. Yet, in the application of the norms to a concrete scenario,
the type of disease matters. Gauging the legal adequacy of measures depends on
empirical information related to risk determination. Our methodological approach –
connected especially to the broader international public authority (IPA) framework
– shows that international health governance is directly linked to the authority of
international institutions such as the WHO or the regional West African Organization.
There is little case law where the normative argument and the empirical facts directly
intersect. Thus, what is left is administrative decision-making by those international
institutions.
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The International Health Regulations’ (IHR) trigger for COVID-19: The WHO’s
position
The IHR is a legal instrument binding for all 194 WHO Member States, plus
Liechtenstein and the Holy See. It provides the main legal framework for the
international response against the cross-border spread of disease. Article 12 of
the IHR authorizes the WHO’s Director-General to declare an event a public health
emergency of international concern. Though not creating new obligations for states,
it represents an instance of executive decision-making raising alertness on the risk
of international spread of a disease, as well as the need of an international response
for its containment.
In 2014, the WHO had a months-long delayed response in raising the alert on the
severity of the spread of Ebola in Guinea. The explaining factors are grounded
on both internal and external governance elements. In the internal dimension,
the institutional delay was inter alia due to a more diplomatic approach by then-
WHO Director-General Margaret Chan. It seems she was reluctant to confront the
involved states, as national political leaders had an interest in not raising any alert
and instead showing they had the outbreak under control. Also, she was to an extent
burnt by the allegation to have triggered the WHO mandate too early during the 2009
H1N1 influenza pandemic. There is an inherent tension in prevention: If it works
perfectly, the avoided harm will not materialize – the same as when the harm is over-
dramatized. A broader, external governance dimension has to do with the consistent
failure by states to develop “core capacities”, as required under Article 5 of the IHR.
Broadly speaking, states are required under Annex 1 IHR to enhance their systems
to a point in which disease surveillance and reporting allows for prompt notification
to the WHO. The yardsticks to measure the fulfillment of such capacities are quite
variable. To this date, effective implementation of the IHR’s obligations is mostly
dependent on extent to which countries have functioning public health institutions
and implementation capacities.
Six years after the outset of the West African Ebola crisis, what picture do we see?
The WHO’s responsiveness arguably improved, as seen in the constant engagement
with the situation in China since the virus was officially reported (31 December
2019). It is certainly not satisfactory to all and is notably the subject of political
scapegoating. Yet other persistent issues are still at hand. As addressed elsewhere,
the vagueness in some of the applicable legal norms, particularly those of the IHR,
leads to diverging interpretations of states’ obligations. Their function is to foster
coordinated responses to the cross-border spread of diseases. The WHO may
then recommend the adoption of specific public health measures in response to an
outbreak.
In its time, the IHR 2005 revision was greeted as an improvement. The IHR are
no longer limited to certain diseases, and expert panels are involved for evidence-
based policy recommendations. But the WHO’s own interpretation of its mandate
and powers is rather inconsistent, for instance when there is unclarity or hesitation in
labelling an event a public health emergency of international concern under Article
12. The value of technical recommendations by the WHO (Article 15 IHR), which
back in 2014 as well as in January 2020 included not adopting travel bans to virus-
- 3 -
affected countries, is still the subject of debate. The lack of oversight of states’
obligations to notify the WHO on several fronts is blatant. In sum, the WHO is still
too prone to policy, and not normativity. A legal perspective focused on consistent
interpretation criteria, as well as clearer reasoning justifying specific decisions, could
sharpen this building block of international health governance.
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